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Poland will hold the second round of its presidential election on 24 May. Bartek Pytlas assesses the
state of play after the ﬁrst round of voting, where the incumbent President, Bronisław Komorowski,
and Andrzej Duda from the opposition Law and Justice party secured enough support to progress to
the next round. He notes that regardless of which candidate ultimately wins the presidency, the
lasting story of the election is likely to be the success of independent ‘anti-system’ candidate Paweł
Kukiz.
While the 2015 presidential election campaign in Poland initially seemed to be heading for a
predictable result, the ﬁrst round of voting provided a jolt for the Polish political establishment. At the onset of the
contest, the incumbent President, Bronisław Komorowski of the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), enjoyed
the overwhelming support of more than half of the electorate. Ultimately, Komorowski only managed to secure 33.8
per cent of the votes in the ﬁrst round, coming in one percentage point behind his main rival, Andrzej Duda from the
national-conservative Law and Justice party (PiS).
The surprise story of the election was undoubtedly the performance of an independent candidate, the rock musician
and civic activist Paweł Kukiz, as shown in Figure 1 below. In February 2015, his support oscillated around the 3 per
cent mark. In the end, he managed to rally 20.8 per cent of voters behind his anti-system platform. What factors led
to this result?
Figure 1: Opinion polling and voting in the ﬁrst round of the 2015 Polish presidential election
Note: Only ﬁgures for the top three candidates are shown. The polling ﬁgures are from TNS 1/4
Note: Only ﬁgures for the top three candidates are shown. The polling ﬁgures are from TNS
Polska Surveys for Wiadomości. First round results are from the Polish Electoral
Commission.
The overwhelming support for Komorowski contributed to the fact that leading ﬁgures of other political parties were
reluctant to invest too much of their eﬀorts into what seemed to be a lost cause. Law and Justice Chairman Jarosław
Kaczyński, unwilling to engage in the campaign before upcoming parliamentary elections later in the year, instead
presented a dynamic, yet relatively unkown MEP, Andrzej Duda, as the PiS candidate. The social-democratic
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), whose presidential contender won 13.7 per cent of the votes in 2010, struggled until
the end to ﬁnd someone willing to compete. In the end, the SLD leadership went with Magdalena Ogórek, an
unknown, young historian with virtually no political experience. Her campaign was almost non-existent, and the
support from the SLD was half-hearted at best.
The feeling increasingly articulated in the public was that the presidential race has already been decided and that
President Komorowski is taking his re-election for granted. His belated and idle campaign seemed to conﬁrm this
judgement. It is under these conditions that the Kukiz’ rhetoric of the return of civic control over politics resonated
well with those portions of the public who anticipated that the popular vote will not matter and who saw their
participation in the election reduced to a mere democratic ritual.
The ghost of politics past
Yet, the success of Kukiz is not only due to short-term factors such as the lack of alternative contenders, lacklusture
campaigning, or the mood generated by a pre-decided plebiscite. It also has roots in the static, frozen patterns of
political contestation with resulting isolation between parties and voters.
At least since 2005, party competition in Poland has oscillated around two actors: Civic Platform and Law and
Justice. The division between “liberal” and “social” Poland articulated by then-Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński
became a bipolar, emotionally laden conﬂict between modernisers and traditionalists. Yet, with time it increasingly
contributed to strategic voting patterns between the supporters of the two camps.
The conﬂict has been kept alive by regular stand-oﬀs between the PO and PiS on moral issues (among others: in
vitro fertilisation or civil partnerships of same-sex couples). Here, the PO government was bound both by its broad
electoral appeal and its own conservative faction. This resulted in reforms becoming frozen and a lack of clear
policy. Public disentchantment grew further due to perceived government inactivity on economic issues, such as
insecurity in the Polish labour market – a development touching in particular upon young people. Finally, the PO
had to face protests over a lack of public consultations in regard to the ratiﬁcation of ACTA and reforms of the
pension system. The PiS on the other hand regularly procured a populist, anti-system critique, contesting election
results and denying the PO’s legitimacy to govern.
Despite growing public dissatisfaction with the lack of clear policy stances and reforms, in previous elections the PO
has been able to proﬁt from its perceived status as the “lesser of two evils”: votes given to the party not on account
of its own positions, but against the radical rhetoric of the PiS. Bronisław Komorowski pursued a similar strategy
during his current presidential campaign. The conﬂict with the PiS has been reframed as a choice between “rational”
and “radical” Poland.
Guarantees of harmony and security, rather than programmatic solutions for currently perceived grievances, were
presented as the main arguments in favour of the incumbent President. Andrzej Duda, on the other hand,
campaigned primarily against Komorowski, aiming solely at the core PiS electorate. The one group that found this
bipolar contest increasingly irrelevant were the youngest voters. Once perceived as the party of “the young”, the PO
consequently lost support in this voter group, who in 2015 largely supported Kukiz, as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Estimated support for parties among young voters in Polish elections (2007-15)
Note: Young voters are deﬁned as those aged between 18 and 25 in 2007 and 2011, but
between 18 and 29 in 2015. This is due to diﬀerent methodology in the polls from which the
ﬁgures are drawn. Figures are from: PBS DGA exit poll (2007); TNS OBOP exit poll (2011);
IPSOS late poll (2015).
The success of Kukiz, who was able to oﬀer an alternative to static, non-programmatic party competition patterns,
did not emerge out of thin air. In 2005 the rock musician himself supported the PO and its “4xYes” civic participation
programme. One of its elements was a petition in favour of single-member constituencies with a ﬁrst-past-the-post
system. As the programme was dropped, in 2012 Kukiz created his own grassroots initiative Zmieleni.pl (“The
Shredded.pl”, currently “Ruch JOW” or “Single-member Disctrict Movement”). He argued that the PO had
“shredded” hundreds of thousands of citizen signatures in favour of single-member districts and therefore departed
from its founding myth of civic participation in politics.
The PiS on the other hand has regularly questioned the democratic legitimation of the government and thus
contributed to the resonance of anti-establishment rhetoric in the mainstream. What the party did not predict,
however, was that the protest embodied by Kukiz will not only be directed against the government. The PiS was
therefore unable to jump on the bandwagon of the Kukiz movement, and instead has been labeled as part of the
same “cemented” Polish political scene.
Is Kukiz here to stay?
Before the parliamentary election in autumn, Paweł Kukiz faces a challenge of re-branding his personal views into a
uniﬁed platform with clear policy positions. The lack of an ideological party family “label” might make this task harder
than in cases of the left-liberal Janusz Palikot or the eccentric, conservative-libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke.
The policy proﬁle of Kukiz, whose self description is a “ right-wing guy with a left-wing heart ”, remains unclear.
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Socio-economically, he tends to lean toward liberalism, but underlines the need for solidarity. Socio-culturally, Kukiz
turns towards national conservatism, stressing the importance of a patriotic and Catholic tradition. He opposes
abortion, is undecided on the question of in vitro fertilisation and supports civic partnerships (while opposing same-
sex marriage). Although these diverse attitudinal considerations are not unusual at the individual level and suﬃce
for a one-time protest vote, they might in the long run become a challenge both for uniting various activist fractions
and for consolidating voters.
Kukiz – similar to Beppe Grillo in Italy – is in this sense a political “anarchist”, whose primary goal is “popular
awakening” against the establishment through civic participation, with only secondary reﬂection on ideological
backgrounds or political consequences. His earlier support of the extreme right “Independence March”, strategically
disguised by its organisers as a popular “patriotic” grassroots movement, seems a good case in point. In 2012 Kukiz
withdrew his backing only after a notorious anti-Semite Jan Kobylański also joined the “honorary committee” of the
nationalist march.
As expected, Kukiz did not back either of the candidates who will compete in the second round of the presidential
election on 24 May. So while old, bipolar voting patterns will still suﬃce to decide who will become the next Polish
president, the autumn election shall be the real test for Kukiz’ anti-system potential. The momentum of his current
success might mobilise enough votes for parliamentary representation. The future parliamentary platform of Kukiz
may nevertheless prove fertile ground for internal conﬂicts and instability – perhaps even more so than in the case of
previous anti-establishment projects.
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